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1. Introduction 
Loughran, Ritter and Rydqvist (1994) report that long-term underperformance, one of 
the three market anomalies associated with initial public offerings (IPOs), can be 
observed in a large number of different capital markets. We find supporting evidence 
of the bad long-run performance of IPOs for a sample of German and UK IPOs. Over 
the five years after the flotation the German and UK IPOs in our sample underperform 
the stock market by 14 per cent and 33 per cent respectively. 
The aim of this paper is to explain this bad long-run performance in our sample by the 
agency problems caused when ownership by the original shareholders is diluted in the 
IPO. This study benefits from a unique set of ownership and performance data on 
British and German IPOs from 1981-88. In a first stage, we explain differences in 
ownership retention by pre-IPO shareholders. Theoretical models explaining 
ownership retention after the IPO normally assume that the initial owners when taking 
their firm public face a trade-off between the benefits of keeping a concentrated 
holding and the benefits of selling out. Bolton and von Thadden (1998) argue that the 
original shareholder of a firm is subject to a trade-off between the benefits from a 
better portfolio diversification and the benefits from monitoring his firm. Kahn and 
Winton’s (1996) model predicts that ownership retention by the initial shareholders 
will be lower in high-growth firms as these firms will need more outside financing 
than low-growth firms. 
In a second stage, we determine whether the often substantial changes in ownership 
by the pre-IPO shareholders after going public explain why IPOs underperform 
similar, non-issuing, companies in the long-run. Two US studies have looked at the 
effect of different levels of ownership retention on IPO performance. Unfortunately, 3  
the studies find contradicting results. Jain and Kini (1994) argue that the bad long-
term performance of IPOs can be partly explained by the decreasing ownership of 
managers immediately after the flotation. The decrease in managerial shareholdings 
following the IPO potentially leads to a worsening of managerial incentives. Jain and 
Kini find a positive link between operating performance and the proportion of shares 
retained by managers after the IPO. Mikkelson, Partch and Shah (1997) record 
managerial ownership over the ten years following the IPO. Contrary to Jain and Kini 
(1994), Mikkelson et al. do not find any consistent relationship between performance 
and changes or levels of ownership at different points in time.  
This contradicting evidence on the impact of agency costs on the performance of IPOs 
calls for further research on the issue. Jain and Kini (1994) use a univariate 
methodology whereas Mikkelson et al. (1997) use ordinary least squares (OLS). Both 
methodologies may be subject to biases. In addition, the OLS estimates may also be 
inconsistent, if there are omitted variables. We will use the advanced econometric 
techniques, developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which do not suffer from such 
problems. 
This paper analyses a unique set of ownership and performance data on British and 
German IPOs. It is interesting to study British and German IPOs for three reasons. 
First, the two countries are examples of the two main systems of corporate 
governance and corporate control, the relationship-based system and the market-based 
system. Second, studying German and UK IPOs, which are characterised by different 
levels of ownership retention by pre-IPO owners, provides an acid test for theoretical 
models explaining ownership retention. Third, if different degrees of ownership 
retention cause different levels of long-term profitability, the sample used in this 4  
study should provide significant results given a cross-sectional variation of ownership 
retention larger than the one in previous studies. Studying German and UK new issues 
should shed further light on the link between ownership and performance in IPOs. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theory relevant to the two 
parts of the paper, the theory relating to ownership retention after the IPO and the one 
relating to ownership and corporate performance. Based on these theories, we develop 
several hypotheses, which will be tested later in the paper. Section 3 describes the 
data sample and the methodology used. Section 4 investigates whether institutional 
differences between Germany and the UK may cause the observed differences in the 
ownership retained by the initial shareholders in the two countries. Section 5 
discusses the results for the econometric model explaining differences in the level of 
ownership retention and the one explaining the bad long-run performance of IPOs by 
sub-optimal levels of ownership retention by pre-IPO shareholders. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
The first part of this section reviews theories explaining the evolution of ownership in 
companies going to the stock market and formulates hypotheses, which will be tested 
in section 5. The second part of this section studies the link between long-term 
performance of IPOs and ownership structure. 
2.1 OWNERSHIP RETENTION 
According to the pecking order theory of capital structure (Myers, 1984), firms prefer 
internal finance to external finance and debt finance to equity finance. Hence, if a 
firm grows at a steady and slow rate, it will be able to finance most of its investment 5  
decisions by retained earnings or debt. However, if the firm grows too fast, the 
founders may be forced to give their firm access to outside equity and consequently 
face a dispersion of control. 
In Kahn and Winton's (1996) model the major shareholder has the choice between 
increasing his firm's value by monitoring the management, and trading on private 
information. Again, a higher demand for liquidity makes selling out more attractive 
than monitoring. Kahn and Winton (1996) as well as Bolton and von Thadden (1998) 
predict that the initial shareholders of firms with a high risk should sell off more 
rapidly than the ones of firms with a low risk. In the case of high-tech firms, once the 
wealth and liquidity constraints prevent shareholders from continuing to provide 
finance, these firms should go public and should end up with a large number of 
shareholders as their technologies are difficult to monitor for non-specialists. 
C1.  The faster the growth rate of the firm the lower the proportion of shares owned 
by the old shareholders six years after the IPO. 
C2.  The incumbent shareholders will divest rapidly out of high-risk firms as the 
portfolio diversification benefits from doing so are more important than the 
benefits from monitoring. 
Furthermore, if the founder or her heirs still has a stake at the IPO, this may indicate 
that private benefits are still significant (e.g. the social status and power derived from 
controlling a listed company) and that control will only be slowly sold off. Founders 
may also have an important leadership role, especially in younger firms (Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Alternatively, Chung and Pruitt (1996) argue that the 6  
founder may still own a large proportion of the equity ‘due strictly to historical 
circumstance’. 
C3.  If the founder or his heirs are still holding shares in the firm immediately 
before the IPO, the proportion of equity owned by the old shareholders six 
years after the flotation will be larger than the one in firms where the 
founder’s family is no longer involved. 
Finally, the possibility to issue non-voting shares may help pre-IPO shareholders to 
keep control long after the IPO by deviating from the one share-one vote rule. 
C4.  Non-voting preference shares help the initial shareholders to retain control a 
long time after the IPO. 
Mello and Parsons (1998) argue that the IPO is only part of a lengthy process of going 
public and that firms go public in several stages until they achieve their optimal 
ownership. Our ownership data support this view. The most significant reductions in 
the ownership by pre-IPO shareholders occur during the first five years after the 
flotation. Hence, we will attempt to explain ownership by the original shareholders 
six years after the IPO rather than explain ownership immediately after the IPO. 
The regression of ownership retention, which we will be running, and the expected 
signs on the individual coefficients are as follows: 
i i i i i i PREF FOUNDER RISK GROWTH OLD ε β β β β α + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ − ⋅ − = 4 3 2 1 6  (1) 
where: 
−  OLD6i is the proportion of voting shares which are owned by the pre-IPO 
shareholders six years after the IPO or in the last year of listing, if the firm left the 
stock exchange before the six-year period. 7  
−  GROWTHi is the average annual growth rate of total assets
1 calculated from the 
year of the IPO to year five. For some firms there may be missing data on total 
assets for some years. The growth rate was computed for all firms with a 
minimum of three years of consecutive data. 
−  RISKi is a measure of the total risk of firm i. 
This is the standard-deviation of the monthly share return over the five years 
following the IPO (or less if the firm left the stock exchange before the end of this 
period).
2 Davis and Pointon (1984) and Leech and Leahey (1991) argue that given 
that large shareholders of firms do not hold diversified portfolios, they should be 
interested in total risk rather than only in undiversifiable risk (i.e. the CAPM-
beta). 
An alternative measure for risk, the standard-deviation of the ratio of cash flow
3 to 
total assets over the period beginning with the year preceding the IPO and ending 
with the fifth year after the IPO (or less if the firm was delisted before the end of 
this period), was also used. However, this second measure was not significantly 
                                         
1 Accounting figures are taken from the consolidated company accounts, if available. 
2 Share price returns are adjusted for dividends, scrip issues and rights issues, and are log-returns. 
3 Cash flow was defined as the published profits gross of tax and interest (before any dividend 
payments on both ordinary and preference shares) + depreciation of tangibles + amortisation of 
intangibles + change in pension provisions (for German firms only) + deferred & future tax (for UK 
firms only) + change in other provisions (for German firms only) + change in temporarily tax-exempt 
reserves (for German firms only). Data sources for the accounting data were the company reports for 
Germany and Datastream, the company reports, Extel and the LSE microfiches for the UK. 8  
different from zero in the estimated regressions. As this measure is only based on 
a maximum of seven data points per firm, it is highly sensitive to outliers.
4 
−  FOUNDERi is a dummy which is one, if the founder or his heirs own shares in 
firm i immediately before the IPO. 
−  PREFi is a dummy which is one, if firm i offers non-voting shares in the IPO.
5 
−  εi is a white noise. 
2.2 LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE AND OWNERSHIP RETENTION 
In this sub-section, we develop hypotheses, which try to explain why IPOs perform 
worse than established, quoted companies during the five-year period following their 
flotation. 
Jain and Kini (1994) as well as Mikkelson et al. (1997) argue that the reduction in 
ownership concentration after the flotation may increase agency problems within the 
firm and that this may have a negative effect on long-term performance. 
C5.  The lower the ownership retention by the pre-IPO shareholders the lower will 
be the long-term performance of the firm. 
Mikkelson et al. (1997) argue that the higher the proportion of secondary shares (as 
opposed to primary shares) sold in the IPO the worse will be the long-term 
                                         
4 The measure of risk retained is an ex-post measure of risk (relative to the IPO) rather than an ex-ante 
measure. However, Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) argue that if the relevant decision makers 
have rational expectations, ex-ante data as well as ex-post data should give consistent answers. 
5 Instead of this dummy variable, an alternative model was estimated using the proportion of non-
voting shares in the equity. The results are not substantially different from those obtained using PREF. 
Among our sample firms only German firms offer non-voting preference shares in their IPO. 9  
performance of the firm after the flotation. They advance two reasons for this. The 
first reason is that the initial owners of the firm may time the IPO to follow a period 
of good performance, which should be followed by a decrease in performance. The 
second reason is that the secondary sale may reduce ownership concentration. 
C6.  The higher the fraction of secondary shares in the IPO the worse will be the 
long-run performance of the firm. 
The regression, which will be estimated, as well as the expected signs on the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are as follows: 
i i i i i SPROP MAIN OLD RETURN ε β β β α + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + = 3 2 1 0 3  (2) 
i i i i i e SPROP b MAIN b OLD b a RETURN + ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ + = 3 2 1 0 5  (3) 
i t i t i ti OLD CF CF γ λ λ ω + ⋅ + ⋅ + = − − 1 , 2 1 , 1 ,      (4) 
−  RETURN3i and RETURN5i are the three-year buy-and-hold returns and the five-
year buy-and-hold returns respectively, calculated from the end of month share 
prices and starting with the return on the second month. These returns were 
computed by using the market model with β=1 and α=0. For Germany we used 
the broad-market DAFOX Index, as developed by Göppl and Schütz (1996) and 
as used by Ljungqvist (1997). The DAFOX Index is a value weighted index. For 
the UK we used the HG 1000 Index, as used by Levis (1993).
6 Levis (1993) 
shows that the Hoare Govett index is a more appropriate performance benchmark 
for UK IPOs than the FTA Index for example.The buy-and-hold return is the 
                                         
6 Note that OLD6, RISK, RETURN3 and RETURN5 are expressed as percentages. 10  
standard measures of performance used in the studies on the long-term 
performance of IPOs (see e.g. Ritter, 1991). 
−  CFi is a measure of performance based on accounting figures rather than share 
prices. It is the annual cash flow defined as the published profit gross of 
depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in provisions divided by the sum of the 
book values of equity and debt of the firm.
7 Both Jain and Kini (1994) and 
Mikkelson et al. (1997) use accounting measures of performance. We use cahs 
flow rather than published earnings, as published earnings of German firms have 
been shown to be very conservative. Correia da Silva (1997) measures the 
published-profit per share and the cash-flow per share for a sample of 221 German 
firms over the period of 1984-1993. He finds that published profits make out only 
25 per cent of the cash flow of the firm. 
−  OLD0i is the proportion of voting shares which are owned by the pre-IPO 
shareholders immediately after the IPO. By definition, ownership by the old 
shareholders immediately before the IPO will be 100 per cent. Hence, OLD0i can 
also be interpreted as 100 per cent minus the change in ownership by old 
shareholders. 
−  MAINi is a dummy which is one, if firm i was floated on the official market. 
−  SECONDARY%i is the proportion of secondary shares sold in the IPO. 
                                         
7 We also used an alternative version of this cash flow ratio, using the same cash flow figures, but 
using the market value of equity and the book value of debt on the denominator. This measure is 
similar to the one used by Healy et al. (1992). The results from estimating the model were not 
substantially different. 11  
−  εi, ei and γi are error terms. The error term γi=ηi+νi,t  where ηi is the fixed-effect 
term and νi,t  is the inter-temporal error term. 
In addition, the following two dummy variables are used as alternatives to 
SECONDARY%i. 
−  PRIMARY%i is a dummy which is one, if firm i offers only primary shares in the 
IPO. 
−  ONLY_SECi is a dummy which is one, if firm i offers only secondary shares in the 
IPO. 
3. Data Analysis 
3.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF GERMAN AND UK IPOS 
Between 1981 and 1988 on average the German firms that went public were almost 
four times older (51 years) than the UK firms (14 years). However, the German IPOs 
were only twice as large as the UK IPOs (£113 million compared to £56 million of 
closing market capitalisation of the first day of listing, adjusted for UK inflation
8). 
The industrial distribution of IPOs in Germany and the UK is also different.
9  
Although the industry group with the highest proportion of IPOs is the same in both 
countries (the electricals, electronics and office equipment group), German IPOs seem 
to be concentrated in mature industries (e.g. mechanical engineering with 15.5 per 
cent of the total number of IPOs and motor components with 5.2 per cent) whereas 
about 29 per cent of the UK IPOs are in more cyclical industries (service agencies 
                                         
8 These amounts are in constant 1985 pounds sterling. 
9 Section 4.2 provides further detail on the industrial classification. 12  
with 9.0 per cent, property with 6.0 per cent, leisure with 5.7 per cent, chain stores 
with 3.6 per cent and construction with 4.9 per cent). 
Hence, in the UK there is a higher frequency of IPOs in the more cyclical service 
industries than in Germany. UK IPOs are also smaller than German IPOs in the same 
industry. Finally, UK IPOs seem to grow faster than German IPOs. 
3.2 DATA SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY 
Information on the identity of existing shareholders, their pre-IPO holdings and their 
post-IPO holdings is obtained from the IPO prospectuses. The holdings of the old 
shareholders are tracked in subsequent annual reports as well as the London Stock 
Exchange Yearbooks for the UK and in the Saling Aktienführer for Germany. The 
period of study is 1981-88. It ends in 1988 to allow for at least six years of ownership 
data (not counting the year of the IPO). 
Share prices were obtained from the Karlsruher Kapitalmarktdatenbank (KKMDB) 
and the London Share Price Database (LSPD). The characteristics of IPOs (age and 
industry) and the closing market capitalisation for the first day of listing were 
obtained from Deutsche Börse AG and London Stock Exchange. Accounting 
information was taken from the IPO prospectuses, company reports, the Extel 
Financial Company Research and Global Vantage CD-ROMs for both countries, and 
also from Datastream and the Extel Microfiches for the UK. 13  
For both the UK and Germany only domestic
10 IPOs listed on the official and 
secondary markets are retained for this study, as data for lower market tiers is not 
normally available. More importantly, we also focus on German and UK IPOs whose 
largest shareholder of the voting equity at the IPO is an individual or a group of 
persons (e.g. a family or unrelated associates) to allow for a similar initial ownership. 
A total of 764 British firms went public during 1981 and 1988, thereof 284 on the 
Official Market and 480 on the USM. From the 96 German IPOs 51 were floated on 
the Official Market and 45 on the Regulated Market. Out of the 96 German IPOs, 80 
were owned by individuals just before the IPO. Ownership could be tracked reliably 
for 61 of these 80 firms.
11  
We match the German IPOs by size to obtain a first UK sample. Firm size is 
measured by market capitalisation in pounds, adjusted for UK inflation by the annual 
GDP deflators (base year 1985) provided by the IMF.
12 Each German company is 
                                         
10 For the UK, given the different legislation, we do not retain companies registered in the Channel 
Islands. 
11 For most of the other IPOs, the identity of the shareholders was available, but not the exact size of 
their holdings. 
12 As several German firms in our sample have dual class shares of which one class is not listed, the 
market capitalisation for these firms was obtained by multiplying the total number of shares by the 
market price of the listed class. 14  
matched with a UK company of the closest size.
13 The sample size for the size-
matched sample is 54 as there was no close match for seven firms.
14 
We also perform an alternative matching by industry. For each German firm the 
industry description at the time of the IPO in the Saling Aktienführer is recorded. 
German firms are reclassified into the two-digit UK SE Groups. This is the industry 
classification used by the London Stock Exchange in its quarterly publications on new 
listings. Each group has a clear-cut definition of the companies that it contains.
15 The 
sample size for the industry-matched sample is 58 as three German IPOs could not be 
matched with UK IPOs. 
The two German samples have 52 firms in common. However, the German sample 
matched by size includes two additional firms, which could be matched by size, but 
not by industry as there were no UK IPOs in these industries during the period. The 
German sample matched by industry contains six additional firms that could be 
matched by industry, but were so large that they could not be matched with UK IPOs 
of a similar size (and ownership).
16 
                                         
13 The average difference in size is 2.7 per cent. The median is 0.5 per cent and the standard-deviation 
is 4.7 per cent. 
14 A close match is defined as a match within a ±25 per cent difference in size. 
15 Groups 27 (Misc. Mechanical Engineering) and 28 (Machine and Other Tools) were merged. Groups 
19 (Electricals), 35 (Electronics) and 69 (Office Equipment) were also merged as groups 35 and 69 did 
not exist at the beginning of the 80s and computer and software manufacturers were first assigned to 
group 19, then to group 69 and later only to group 35. 
16 It may be argued that another matching based on the age of firms should have been performed. 
However, a reasonable match (plus or minus two years of difference) could only be found for about 19 15  
3.3 DATA DESCRIPTION 
Table 1 records the number of shares held by the initial shareholders for the size 
sample for each of the seven years starting with the year of the IPO. Firms which are 
taken over before the end of the period of study are still reported in the table. They are 
reported as having a zero per cent ownership by the old shareholders from the year of 
the takeover. Similarly, firms, which were taken private after the IPO, are also 
reported over the whole period with a 100 per cent ownership by the original 
shareholders from the year of going private. 
For a few firms which did however not leave the sample, data on ownership were not 
always available for each of the individual years. In these cases, information available 
on the matched firm was still reported in the table. This and the bankruptcies / 
liquidations explain the slightly different sample sizes for some years. 
Permanent reductions in sample size are due to bankruptcy and liquidation only. It is 
crucial to keep UK takeover targets within the sample as in the UK investors who 
acquire more than 30 per cent of the equity of a firm must make an offer for the 
entirety of the equity,
17 and one cannot obtain majority control over a UK company 
without preventing it from leaving the listing. As there is no compulsory tender offer 
in Germany, an investor can for example acquire a majority stake in a company and 
the company remains on the stock market. 
                                                                                                                                            
German firms. Similarly, we tried to match firms simultaneously by size and industry. However, again 
for more than three-quarters of the firms no match could be found. 
17 This obligation does not apply to the incumbent shareholders whose holding after the IPO still 
exceeds 30 per cent. See Weinberg and Rabinowitz (1989), paragraphs 3-939, 3-946, 3-952. 16  
For the UK size sample, 24 firms left the listing of which 20 were taken over, two 
were taken private again by their initial shareholders, one was liquidated and one 
entered into receivership. For the UK industry sample, there was a total of 23 
cancellations. Nineteen were taken over, two were liquidated and two went into 
receivership. Franks et al. (1998) report that on average every year four per cent of 
the listed UK companies are taken over. Hence, the takeover rate among recently 
floated companies is higher (between 6.4 and 7.4 per cent) than the one for the UK 
stock market. Conversely, only one German firm left the listing, the reason being a 
full takeover. This firm is both part of the sample matched by size and the sample 
matched by industry. 
Table 1
18 shows that, first, the old shareholders of UK firms lose majority control on 
average after already two years whereas the old shareholders of German firms lose 
majority control after only five to six years. Second, although the fraction of the 
voting equity held by old shareholders both in German and UK firms decreases over 
time, ownership by the old shareholders is consistently higher in the Germany than in 
the UK. The difference in means is consistently different from zero at the five per cent 
level. 
Our UK results on ownership retention are very similar to those obtained by Brennan 
and Franks (1997) who find that for a sample of 69 IPOs in 1986-89 (excluding 
investment and closed-end mutual funds) old shareholders own 59.23% immediately 
after the IPO. 
                                         
18 A table similar to Table 1, but based on the industry-sample, is available from the author on request. 17  
Despite matching firms by size on one side, and matching firms by industry on the 
other side, there are still differences in ownership retention by the original 
shareholders. However, these differences may be less substantial than one may 
initially expect. 
Three conclusions can be drawn from Table 1. First, even after adjusting for size and 
industry, the ownership of German and UK companies still evolves in a different way. 
Second, the pre-IPO shareholders of UK IPOs tend to retain a much smaller 
percentage of the equity than those of German IPOs. Third, old shareholders of 
British companies seem to transfer control to new shareholders much quicker than old 
shareholders of German firms. 
Table 2 describes the characteristics of the size-sample. UK firms seem to grow faster 
than German firms. The difference is economically significant but not statistically 
different from zero. UK firms also seem to have on average a significantly higher risk 
(significant at the one per cent level). 
Although the proportion of German firms with the founder’s family still being a 
shareholder at the time of the IPO is higher than that of UK firms, the difference in 
the proportions is not statistically different at any of the usual levels of confidence 
using a two-tailed Z-test for comparing two counts following a binomial distribution. 
According to the three-year buy-and-hold returns, German firms perform better than 
UK firms. However, the five-year buy-and-hold returns suggest that there is no such 
difference in performance. The results found for the UK are similar to those found by 
Levis (1993): the long-term underperformance continues beyond the 36-month period 
after the flotation. More than a third of German IPOs comprise only primary shares. 18  
The proportion for the UK IPOs is only 11 per cent. The difference in the proportions 
is significant at the ten per cent level. However, there is no significant difference 
between proportions of IPOs offerings only secondary shares, or the proportions of 
secondary shares offered in the IPO.  
For the industry-matched sample
19 German firms are larger and less risky than their 
British counterparts. Again, UK firms seem to grow faster. The difference in the 
average growth between the two countries is however not statistically different from 
zero. At the time of the IPO, the founder or members of his family still hold shares in 
93 per cent of the German companies, but hold shares in only 76 per cent of the 
British firms (the difference is significant at the 5 per cent level for the Z-test). A 
more striking observation is probably that British firms have on average a higher level 
of risk than German firms. There is no difference in the performance of British and 
German firms operating in the same industry. 
The firms in the industry sample were also divided into four categories: capital goods 
(groups 11-35, 69), durable consumer goods (groups 36-43
20), non-durable consumer 
goods (groups 45-65) and other groups (groups 66-76, excluding group 69 and group 
86 (property)).
21 As previously noted German companies are larger, except for firms 
producing durable consumer goods and they are significantly smaller for firms in 
other groups. Although the average size of a German IPO in the former class is higher 
                                         
19 A table similar to Table 2 is available from the author for the industry sample. 
20 The group 44 does not exist in the classification. 
21  Other groups comprises plastic and rubber fabricators (66), pharmaceutical products (67) and 
agencies (75) as well as groups 68-74, which were however not represented by firms of our sample. 19  
by more than 100 million pounds, the standard-deviation of the size is about 5 times 
larger than for the UK. German companies in the capital goods groups, non-durable 
consumer goods and in other groups are on average less risky than their UK 
counterparts. However, there is no significant difference in means for the durable 
consumer goods class. Again, there is no significant difference in the share 
performance of British and German firms matched by industry. 
The lower concentration of ownership by the initial shareholders after the IPO in UK 
firms, reported in Table 1, may be due to more stringent UK listing rules. It may be 
the case that a UK firm asking to be admitted to the stock market may have to float a 
larger proportion of its equity than a German firm. The following section investigates 
whether this is really the case. 
4. UK and German Listing Conditions and Issuing Procedures 
Table 3 summarises the listing requirements applying to the different market tiers in 
Great-Britain and Germany. The conditions relating to age, size and dispersion of 
equity are almost identical. The listing rules for both countries are very similar and 
cannot therefore be the reason for different sizes, industries and ages of IPOs in both 
countries. 
Both in Germany and the UK ordinary shares and non-voting preference shares can in 
principle be admitted to the listing. In both countries, ordinary shares carry one vote 
per share and preference shares do not normally confer the right to vote at the annual 
shareholders’ meeting. In practice, however, UK firms rarely have outstanding non-
voting shares and to the opposite of German firms, if such shares exist, they are 
normally owned by the founders rather than by outside investors. Brennan and Franks 20  
(1997) state that ‘investing institutions and the London Stock Exchange have 
discouraged the issuance of non-voting shares and other devices for discriminating 
against different shareholders’. Among all the UK firms in the two samples, only two 
firms had preference shares. In both cases, the preference shares were issued prior to 




Section 5.1 contains the results for the regression explaining ownership by the pre-
IPO shareholders six years after the IPO. Section 5.2 reports the results for the 
regression explaining the long-run performance. 
5.1 THE OWNERSHIP RETENTION MODEL 
Table 4 displays the results from the OLS estimation of equation (1). The first two 
columns and the last two columns report the results for size and industry samples 
respectively. Each regression is run on the pooled German and UK firms. The pooled 
                                         
22 Hay and Morris (1984) argue that in the UK inheritance taxes often force families owning large 
unlisted firms to sell off a substantial part of the equity on the stock market at the death of the founder 
to meet the tax liability. Inheritance taxes may be significantly higher in the UK than in Germany. If 
this is true, then the founder of a UK company dies, his heirs may be forced to sell a much more 
important part of the equity to meet the tax bill than is the case for a German company. Goergen (1998) 
analyses inheritance tax rates applying to an average-sized German IPO and an average-sized UK IPO 
over the period 1980-95. His findings suggest that the German IPO would have faced a tax charge of 
35 per cent of its value whereas the UK IPO would have faced a tax charge ranging from 20 to 37.5 
per cent of its value. Thus, inheritance taxes incurred by families owning large companies in the UK 
have been on average lower than those incurred by families in Germany. 21  
samples include all the firms, even those that were taken over or left the stock market 
for another reason before the end of the six-year period.  
The regressions in the first and third columns were estimated using the LIMDEP 
software and the OLS stepwise regression technique. The four variables from 
equation (1) were forced into the regression as well as the differential intercept, 
COUNTRY.
23 Additional variables were all the variables picking up any differential 
effect for the German IPOs (e.g. the differential slope coefficient on GROWTH, 
measuring any additional effect of the variable for the German firms). The use of the 
stepwise procedure ensures that the OLS regressions do not include any variables 
whose explanatory power is low or non-existent. First, it is interesting to note that the 
differential intercept COUNTRY is not significantly different from zero at any of the 
usual levels of confidence. Second, none of the differential slope coefficients were 
retained by the stepwise algorithm. This suggests that differences in the levels of the 
explanatory variables pick up all the differences in ownership retention between 
Germany and the UK. 
Columns two and four are standard OLS regressions run on the four variables 
underlying the four above conjectures. 
Except for the variables FOUNDER in the regression run on the pooled size-sample 
and GROWTH in the regression run on the pooled industry-sample, the coefficients 
on the four explanatory variables are significantly different from zero at the five per 
cent level of confidence or better. 
                                         
23 Dropping the differential intercept COUNTRY from the list of forced variables does not influence 
the results in columns (1) and (3) in Table 4. 22  
The results for the size sample suggest that the higher a company’s growth rate the 
less will be the ownership retained by the pre-IPO shareholders six years after the 
IPO. The results for the industry sample are less strong (at the 20 per cent level at 
best).
24 This is probably not surprising as firms in the same industry should have a 
similar growth rate and the growth rate should not be a strong explanatory variable for 
the different levels of ownership retention. Firms of a similar size, but operating in 
different industries, may have very different growth rates and growth should be better 
at explaining differences in insider retention.
25 
In general, we cannot reject conjecture one. Alternative specifications of the growth 
variable were also used, such as a dummy variable set to one if the growth rate 
exceeds a given threshold (e.g. 20 per cent) and a dummy variable set to one if the 
company’s growth is higher than the average growth. However, none of these 
alternative specifications gave any significant results.
26 
Initial owners of high-risk firms will retain less ownership of their firms than those of 
low-risk firms. The coefficient on RISK is in a consistent way significantly different 
from zero at the five per cent level of confidence. We do not reject conjecture two. 
                                         
24 Due to the nature of accounting figures (past and present price data), time dummies were also 
included in the model. This did not change the significance of the coefficient on GROWTH. 
25 The significance of the coefficient on GROWTH does not change in both models, if a size variable 
and industry dummies are included. 
26 A variable measuring company size (market capitalisation at the end of the first day of trading) was 
also added to the models run on the industry. However, this did not improve the significance of the 
coefficient on GROWTH. 23  
Our results corroborate the findings by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Leech and 
Leahy (1991) on the link between ownership and risk. 
Ownership of voting shares is also higher, if the founder or his family were still 
holding shares at the time of the IPO. This conclusion is always true for the German 
firms, but only true for the UK firms matched by industry. We do not reject 
conjecture three. This result is consistent with the result found by Chung and Pruitt 
(1996). 
There is also a higher ownership retention, if the firm issued non-voting preference 
shares. The coefficient on PREF is significantly different from zero at the one per cent 
or five per cent level of confidence. We retain conjecture four. 
Our findings suggest that post-IPO ownership by the original shareholders depends on 
a series of corporate characteristics and other factors. These findings are consistent 
with those of Denis and Denis (1994). Denis and Denis compare majority-owned 
firms to widely held ones. They find that firms with a majority ownership have a 
higher family involvement, tend to have dual-class shares, and that firms with a 
dispersed ownership tend to have a higher variance of the residual from the market 
model. Denis and Denis do not include a growth rate in their model. 
5.2 LONG-TERM PERFORMANCE AND OWNERSHIP RETENTION 
In addition to the variables in equations (2) and (3), we include the variable MAIN 
into the regressions, a dummy variable, which is set to one if the firm was floated on 
the official market and set to zero if it was floated on the second market tier. The 
estimation technique is similar to the one used for the ownership retention model. 
Again, a stepwise regression technique is used, forcing the ownership retention 
variable as well as the variables COUNTRY, MAIN and SECONDARY% into the 24  
regression and suggesting the differential slope coefficients as well as PREF and 
FOUNDER as possible additional regressors. 
Table 5 contains the results for the buy-and-hold return and OLD0, i.e. ownership 
retention by the original shareholders immediately after the IPO. At the ten per cent 
level of confidence, none of the coefficients on OLD0 is significantly different from 
zero. However, there is some evidence for both models that a higher proportion of 
secondary shares offered in the IPO is connected with a worse long-run performance. 
The link exists for the UK firms, but not for the German firms: the differential slope 
coefficient for the German firms is of the opposite sign and of a similar magnitude in 
absolute terms as the general coefficient on SECONDARY%. In general, the models 
explaining long-term performance of IPOs by ownership retention have no or only a 




adjusted and the F-test suggest. It is also 
interesting to note that the stepwise procedure did not retain PREF as an explanatory 
variable. This suggests that non-voting shares are not in general a means to 
expropriate the new shareholders in the firm. This is in line with the results found by 
Bergström and Rydqvist (1990). They find that for a sample of Swedish firms the 
existence of non-voting shares cannot normally be associated with expropriation of 
small shareholders. 
Table 5 displays only one of the many specifications that were tested. Alternative 
specifications included variables such as the categories (e.g. firms which offer less 
than 25 per cent of the total equity (voting plus non-voting equity) in the IPO) and the 
natural logarithm of one plus the fraction of share capital offered in the IPO as used 
by Ljungqvist (1997), as well as quadratic specifications of the ownership variables 
defined at the beginning of this section. Other models regressed the buy-and-hold 25  
return for years 4-5 on ownership in year 1, 2 and 3 respectively without any 
significant results. None of these alternative models suggests a link between long-run 
performance and ownership retention.  
Table 6 reports the results for model (4),  the model based on the accounting measure 
of performance. The model is a dynamic panel data model, estimated using the 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) in first differences and in levels as 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Contrary to OLS, this estimation method 
provides consistent estimates if there are unobserved effects. The method uses a 
system of equations. The system consists of the equations in levels as well as the 
equations in first differences. The estimation method uses the lagged differences of 
the dependent variable and the independent variables as instruments for the equations 
in levels. In addition, it uses the lagged levels of the dependent variable and the 
independent variables as instruments for the equations in first differences. For model 
(4) we use a similar methodology to one of models (2) and (3), i.e. we use a 
differential intercept, COUNTRY, and differential slope coefficients. 
Table 6 shows that for the size sample there is no evidence that past ownership by the 
initial shareholders influences current performance. The results for the industry 
sample are similar. This is consistent with the results found by Mikkelson et al. 
(1997) on US IPO data. 
Ljungqvist (1997) finds a negative link between ownership retention and long-run 
performance for a sample of German IPOs. However, his sample includes several 
privatisations and spin-offs and firms are not of a homogenous initial ownership. 
Similarly to Jain and Kini (1994) we split the sample into firms whose ownership 
retention exceeds the sample median and those whose ownership retention is below 26  
the median. Again, there is no evidence of a link between performance and ownership 
retention.
27 
The likely absence of a link between long-run performance in IPOs and ownership 
characteristics is a very interesting result, especially in the context of the results 
obtained from the estimation of the ownership retention model. All in all, the results 
suggest that ownership retention depends on corporate characteristics such as risk and 
growth rate and that firms choose an ownership structure, which maximises their firm 
value. These results are consistent with an increasing amount of studies using 
different samples and estimation techniques and that also do not find a link between 
financial performance and ownership characteristics (see e.g. Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996), Kole (1996) and Loderer and Martin (1997)). 
6. Conclusion 
This study has found that German IPOs are in more mature industries than UK IPOs. 
They are also older and larger than their UK counterparts. Analysing ownership 
retention after the IPO as well as its evolution during subsequent years shows that the 
initial shareholders of UK IPOs lose control much quicker than those of German IPOs 
and that the fraction of shares owned by new shareholders is significantly higher in 
UK IPOs at all times. 
Differences in ownership retention can be explained by corporate characteristics such 
as the firm’s growth rate, its total risk, the involvement of the founder as well as the 
                                         
27 Industry dummies were also added to the model run on the pooled size-sample and a size variable 
was added to the industry-sample. This did however not affect the results in any substantial way. 27  
issue of non-voting shares. This suggests that results obtained from studies on 
corporate performance and ownership that have assumed ownership to be exogenous 
may suffer from serious econometric biases. 
This study sheds further light on the link between ownership by the initial 
shareholders and financial performance. Contrary to existing studies, the study uses 
advanced econometric techniques, which provide consistent estimates even if there 
are omitted variables. We find that the bad long-term performance of IPOs cannot be 
explained by the observed dilution of ownership by the original shareholders after the 
IPO and possible agency conflicts caused by this dilution. Our findings are consistent 
with Mikkelson et al. (1997), but are in direct contradiction with Jain and Kini (1994). 28  
References 
Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C. (1996) Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control 
Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders, North Carolina State 
University, mimeo. 
Barber, B. and Lyon, J. (1996) Detecting Abnormal Operating Performance: The 
Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics, Journal of Financial 
Economics 41, 359–399. 
Bergström, C. and Rydqvist, K. (1990) Ownership of Equity in Dual-Class Firms, 
Journal of Banking & Finance 14, 255–269. 
Blundell, R. and Bond, S. (1998) Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in 
Dynamic Panel Data Models, Journal of Econometrics, 87, 115-143. 
Bolton, P. and von Thadden, E.-L. (1998) Liquidity and Control: A Dynamic Theory 
of Corporate Ownership Structure, forthcoming in Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics. 
Brennan, M. and Franks, J. (1997) Underpricing, Ownership and Control in Initial 
Public Offerings of Equity Securities in the UK, Journal of Financial Economics 
45, 391–413. 
Chung, K. and Pruitt, S. (1996) Executive Ownership, Corporate Value, and 
Executive Compensation: A Unifying Framework, Journal of Banking & Finance 
20, 1135–1159. 
Correia da Silva, L. (1997) Corporate Control and Financial Policy. An Empirical 
Investigation of Dividend Policy in Germany, unpublished DPhil Thesis, University 
of Oxford. 
Cutik, U. (1988) Aus der Sicht der Banken. Auch bei verändertem Umfeld an die 
Börse, in Herdt, H., Padberg, E. and Walther, D. (eds), Der Gang an die Börse, 
Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Börsen-Zeitung, 16–27. 
Davis, E. and Pointon, J. (1984), Finance and the Firm, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K. (1985) The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and 
Consequences, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177. 
Denis, D.J. and Denis, D.K. (1994) Majority Owner-Managers and Organizational 
Efficiency, Journal of Corporate Finance 1, 91-118. 
Franks, J., Mayer, C. and Renneboog, L. (1998) Who Disciplines Bad Management, 
CentER Working Paper, Tilburg University. 
Göppl, H. and Schütz, H. (1996) Die Konzeption eines Deutschen Aktienindex für 
Forschungszwecke (DAFOX), Discussion Paper No. 162, University of Karlsruhe. 
Goergen, M. (1998) Corporate Governance and Financial Performance. A Study of 
German and UK Initial Public Offerings, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Hay, D. and Morris, D. (1984) Unquoted Companies: Their Contribution to the 
United Kingdom Economy, London: Macmillan. 
Healy, P., Palepu, K. and Ruback, R. (1992) Does Corporate Performance Improve 
after Mergers, Journal of Financial Economics 31, 135–175. 
Jain, B. and Kini, O. (1994) The Post-Issue Operating Performance of IPO Firms, 
Journal of Finance 49, 1699–1726. 
Kahn, C. and Winton, A. (1996) Ownership Structure, Liquidity Demand, and 
Shareholder Monitoring, University of Illinois and Northwestern University, 
mimeo. 29  
Kole, S. (1996) Managerial Ownership and Firm Performance: Incentives or 
Rewards?, Advances in Financial Economics 2. 
Leech, D. and Leahy, J. (1991) Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications 
and the Performance of Large British Companies, Economic Journal 101, 1418–
1437. 
Levis, M. (1993) The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings: The UK 
Experience 1980-1988, Financial Management, 28–41. 
Ljunqvist, A. (1996) Can Firms Outwit the Market? Timing Ability and the Long-Run 
Performance of IPOs, in: Levis, M. (ed), Empirical Issues in Raising Equity 
Capital, North Holland: Elsevier. 
Ljunqvist, A. (1997) Pricing Initial Public Offerings: Further Evidence from 
Germany, European Economic Review 41, 1309–1320. 
Loderer, C. and Martin, K. (1997), Executive Stock Ownership and Performance: 
Tracking Faint Traces, Journal of Financial Economics 45, 223–255. 
Loughran, T., Ritter J. and Rydqvist, K. (1994) Initial Public Offerings: International 
Insights, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 2, 165–199. 
Mello, A. and Parsons, J. (1998) Going Public and the Ownership Structure of the 
Firm, Journal of Financial Economics 49, 79-109. 
Mikkelson, W., Partch, M. and Shah, K. (1997) Ownership and Operating 
Performance of Companies that Go Public, Journal of Financial Economics 44, 
281–307. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1988) Management Ownership and Market 
Valuation. An Empirical Analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293–315. 
Myers, S. (1984) The Capital Structure Puzzle, Journal of Finance 39, 581–582. 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F. and Zingales, L. (1998) Why Do Companies Go Public? An 
Empirical Analysis, Journal of Finance 53, 27–64. 
Ritter, J. (1991) The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, Journal of 
Finance 46, 3–27. 
Weinberg, M. and Rabinowitz, L. (1989 + updates), Weinberg and Blank on Take-
overs and Mergers, London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Zingales, L. (1995) Insider Ownership and the Decision to Go Public, Review of 
Economic Studies 62, 425–448. 30  
  
 
Table 1: Average proportion of voting rights held by the old shareholders in 
the size-matched sample 
(1) If a company is taken over and leaves the stock exchange, it will be recorded as a company owned 100 per cent by its 
new shareholders from the year of the takeover. If a company is taken private by its original shareholders, it will be 
recorded as a company owned 100 per cent by its original shareholders. (2) *** indicates that the difference in means is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
  German firms  UK firms  t-statistic for 
difference in 
means 









Immediately after the IPO  76.4% 54 62.6% 54 2.9*** 
1 year  73.6% 54 51.3% 54 4.6*** 
2 years  69.1% 54 47.0% 54 4.2*** 
3 years  63.8% 54 38.7% 52 4.2*** 
4 years  59.0% 54 30.3% 52 4.8*** 
5 years  51.2% 54 25.5% 52 4.1*** 
6 years  45.3% 54 24.2% 48 3.3*** 
Source: 
−  For Germany, own calculations based on IPO prospectuses and Saling. 
−  For the UK, own calculations based on IPO prospectuses, company reports, London Stock  
Exchange and Extel. 31  
Table 2: The sample characteristics of the size-matched sample
(1) The table is based on a sample of German and UK IPOs matched by market capitalisation.  The sample is unbalanced i.e.
if a firm leaves the listing before the sixth year after the flotation, then the shareholder for the last year of the listing is
reported. (2) Growth is the average annual growth rate of total assets. Founder is a dummy variable which equals one if the
founder or her family own shares in the firm at the time of the IPO. Risk is the standard-deviation of the monthly share return
over the five years following the IPO (or less if the firm was delisted before the end of this period). Primary Shares and
Secondary Shares are dummy variables which equal one if the firm offers only primary shares and secondary shares in the
IPO respectively. RETURN3 and RETURN5 are the three-year buy-and-hold return and the five-year buy-and-hold return
calculated using the market model with β=1 and α=0.  (3) *** Significant at the 1 per cent level for the two-tailed test. *
Significant at the 10 per cent level for the two-tailed test.




















Mean 17.8 9.1 - 6.3 -14.2 - - 38.3
Median 13.5 9.0 - 0.4 -13.1 - - 29.2
Propor-
tion =1
- - 92.0 - - 38.9 14.8 -
Min -2.3 4.8 - -85.5 -186.3 - - 0.0
Max 75.5 15.9 - 120.9 92.7 - - 100.0
Sample
size




















Mean 23.7 12.8 - -32.9 -33.1 - - 49.1
Median 18.7 12.9 - -24.1 -25.0 - - 50.0
Propor-
tion =1
- - 84.9 - - 11.3 9.4 -
Min -20.5 4.8 - -261.8 -363.5 - - 0.0
Max 111.2 22.4 - 103.5 165.7 - - 100.0
Sample
size
44 53 53 53 53 53 53 53
Panel B: t-statistics for the difference in means and Z-statistics for difference in proportions








1.111 -5.645*** 1.157 2.985*** 1.107 3.283* 0.852 -1.630
 32  
Table 3:    Listing requirements for the London Stock Exchange and the German
        Stock Exchanges 
(a) The market capitalisation refers to the total market value of all securities to be listed. Securities of lower value may be admitted 
if the LSE believes that there will be an 'adequate market'. (b) The 'public' does not include directors as well as connected persons 
and shareholders holding at least 5 per cent of the shares. 
  UK Germany 
Requirements Official 
Market 







Legal form:  public limited 
company 
idem idem AG  or  KGaA  idem idem 
Accounts  / 
age: 









- three years, 
otherwise 
  age of at least 
three years 
nil nil 














    nil nil nil 





nil nil at  least 
DM2.5 mil-




of total equity 
must be 
freely avail-





at least 25% 
of the class of 
shares where 
application 
for listing has 
been made
b 
at least 10% 
of the class of 
shares 
nil, but 10% 
recommended 
at least 25% 
of the class of 
shares 
refer to size  nil 
Source: Goergen (1998) 33  
Table 4: Results from the ownership retention model for the pooled sample
matched by size and the pooled sample matched by industry  (p-values in
parentheses)
(a) The dependent variable is OLD6, i.e. the fraction of voting shares owned by the old shareholders six years after the IPO.
Country is a dummy which is set to one if the firm is German. Growth is the average annual growth rate of total assets.
Founder is a dummy variable which equals one if the founder or her family own shares in the firm at the time of the IPO.
Pref is a dummy which is equal to one, if the firm has non-voting shares. Risk is the standard-deviation of the monthly share
return over the five years following the IPO (or less if the firm was delisted before the end of this period (b) The t-statistics
are robust for heteroskedasticity. (c) p-values are in parentheses..
Model Size Industry














































R2 0.239 0.237 0.232 0.226
R2
adjusted 0.191 0.199 0.190 0.193
p-value of F-statistic 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sample size 85 85 98 98
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Table 5: Long-term performance model for the pooled sample matched by size
and the pooled sample matched by industry (p-values in parentheses)
(a) The dependent variable is the buy-and-hold return over the first three years following the IPO or the buy-and-hold return
over the first five years following the IPO respectively. COUNTRY is a dummy which is set to one if the firm is German.
OLD0 is the percentage of the voting equity owned by the initial shareholders immediately after the IPO. MAIN is a dummy
variable which equals one if the firm was floated on the main market tier. SECONDARY% is the proportion of the secondary
shares sold in the IPO. SECONDARY% D is SECONDARY% multiplied by COUNTRY. (b) The t-statistics are robust for
heteroskedasticity. (3) p-values are in parentheses.
Model Size Industry












































R2 0.165 0.043 0.033 0.023
R2
adjusted 0.122 0.003 -0.002 -0.013
p-value of F-statistic 0.003 0.367 0.447 0.633
Sample size 102 102 113 113
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Table 6: Performance model with cash-flow ratio (CF) and the total stake held 
by all pre-IPO shareholders  for the size sample 
(a) CFi,t  is the dependent variable in each model.  It is the cash flow adjusted for depreciation, interest, taxes and changes in 
provisions divided by the book values of equity and debt.  COUNTRY is the differential intercept, COUNTRY being set to one if 
firm i is German.  Toldi,t is the total percentage of the voting equity held by the pre-IPO shareholders.  Variable names marked 
with a D are the differential slope coefficients for German  firms.  (b) The model contains time dummies and industry dummies. 
(c) m1 and m2 are tests for the absence of first-order and second-order correlation in the residuals respectively.  These test 
statistics are asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation.  (d) The Sargan test statistic is a test of 
the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(k) under the null of valid instruments, with k degrees of 
freedom reported in parentheses.  (e) The model is a linear system of first-differenced and levels equations.  The instruments are 
levels of CF1, CF1_D, Told, and Told_D dated t-2 to t-99  for the differenced equations and first differences dated t-1 for the 
levels equations.  (f) p-values, based on standard-errors asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, are reported in 
parentheses. 
Constant  0.053    
(0.331) 
COUNTRY  0.034    
(0.562) 
CF1i,t-1  0.638    
(0.000) 
CF1_Di,t-1 -0.221   
 (0.313) 
Toldi,t-1 0.024   
(0.762) 
Told_Di,t-1  0.024   
(0.791) 
p-value of m1 0.000 
p-value of m2 0.207 
p-value of Sargan test (d.f.)  0.664 
(46) 
Observations 265 
 